Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating a China-based independent “teapot” refinery Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. for its role in purchasing more than a billion dollars’ worth of Iranian crude oil, including from a front company for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). OFAC is also imposing additional sanctions on several companies and vessels responsible for facilitating Iranian oil shipments to China as part of Iran’s “shadow fleet.”
“Any refinery, company, or broker that chooses to purchase Iranian oil or facilitate Iran’s oil trade places itself at serious risk,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “The United States is committed to disrupting all actors providing support to Iran’s oil supply chain, which the regime uses to support its terrorist proxies and partners.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 13902, which targets Iran’s petroleum and petrochemical sectors, and is OFAC’s second action against a teapot refinery that has purchased Iranian crude oil. This also marks the sixth round of sanctions targeting Iranian oil sales since the President issued National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), instituting a campaign of maximum economic pressure on Iran.
OFAC is also issuing an updated sanctions advisory to assist the global shipping and maritime industry in identifying sanctions evasion practices related to the shipment of Iranian-origin petroleum, petroleum products, or petrochemical products and in implementing sanctions compliance best practices to guard against such sanctions risks.
INdependent refinery PURCHASING IRANIAN OIL
Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd. (Shandong Shengxing) is an independent teapot refinery in Shandong Province that has received dozens of shipments of Iranian crude oil worth more than a billion dollars from shadow fleet vessels, some of which have been sanctioned for their role transporting Iranian petroleum, including the newly sanctioned NYANTARA (IMO 9242120), RESTON (IMO 9265744), and the recently sanctioned BRAVA LAKE (IMO 9232876).
Between March 2020 and January 2023, Shandong Shengxing sent more than $800 million in wire transfers to China Oil and Petroleum Company Limited (COPC). COPC was an IRGC-QF front company that aided in selling Iranian oil to China. COPC laundered billions through the U.S. financial system in support of the IRGC-QF, $108 million of which was seized by the U.S. Justice Department.
Shandong Shengxing is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.
MAINTAINING PRESSURE ON THE SHADOW FLEET
Iran relies on a network of opaque ownership and ship management companies to manage a shadow fleet of tankers that conduct ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate Iran’s petroleum shipments to China. The Cameroon-flagged RESTON (IMO 9265744), and the Panama-flagged BESTLA (IMO 9295593), EGRET (IMO 9283801), NYANTARA (IMO 9242120), and RANI (IMO 9250907), have shipped billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian oil, including to China-based refineries, generating vital revenue for the Iranian regime and its proxies.
In early 2025, the RESTON received more than one million barrels of Iranian oil from ship-to-ship transfers involving sanctioned tankers, including the WEN YAO (IMO 9288095) and FIONA (IMO 9365752), which were sanctioned on October 11, 2024 and February 24, 2025, respectively.
In early 2025, the BESTLA received approximately two million barrels of Iranian oil via a ship-to-ship transfer from the sanctioned vessel ATILA (IMO 9233753), which was previously known as the HECATE and sanctioned on April 4, 2024 for its role shipping Iranian oil involving Iranian military front company Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars.
Also in early 2025, EGRET conducted a ship-to-ship transfer of Iranian oil from the sanctioned National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) tanker DUNE (IMO 9569712) near Indonesian waters.
Lastly, in early 2025, the NYANTARA received hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian oil from the SALVIA (IMO 9569700), which was sanctioned on October 11, 2024. The RANI also received hundreds of thousands of barrels of Iranian oil from sanctioned NITC tanker DERYA (IMO 9569700), before delivering the oil to China in early 2025.
Panama-based Oceanic Orbit Incorporated is the owner of the RESTON, while Malaysia-based Pro Mission SDN BHD is the ship manager, operator, and technical manager of the RESTON. Marshall Islands-based Bestla Company Limited is the registered owner, ship manager, and commercial operator of the BESTLA. Hong Kong-based Dexiang Shipping Co., Limited is the registered owner of the EGRET. Panama-based Civic Capital Shipping Inc., Starboard Shipping Inc., and Oceanic Orbit Incorporated are the registered owners of the NYANTARA, RANI, and RESTON, respectively.
OFAC is designating Oceanic Orbit Incorporated, Pro Mission SDN BHD, Bestla Company Limited, Dexiang Shipping Co., Limited, Civic Capital Shipping Inc., and Starboard Shipping Inc. pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in the petroleum sector of the Iranian economy.
OFAC is identifying RESTON, BESTLA, EGRET, NYANTARA, and RANI as blocked property in which Oceanic Orbit Incorporated, Bestla Company Limited, Dexiang Shipping Co., Limited, Civic Capital Shipping Inc., and Starboard Shipping Inc. have an interest, respectively.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC or exempt, U.S. sanctions generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities with designated or otherwise blocked persons.