Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating 21 individuals and entities and identifying one vessel that have transferred oil products, procured weapons and dual-use equipment, and provided financial services for Iran-backed terrorist organization Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. This action targets financial conduits between the Iranian government and the Houthis, building on previous Treasury actions to constrict the Iranian regime’s use of its oil wealth to fund regional terrorist proxies at the expense of the Iranian population’s welfare. It also targets key front companies, facilitators, and operatives located in Yemen, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) that are part of the Houthis’ vast revenue generation and smuggling networks, which enable the group to sustain its capability to conduct destabilizing regional activities and unprovoked attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea.
“The Houthis threaten the United States by committing acts of terror and attacking commercial vessels transiting the Red Sea. Treasury is taking action to cut off nearly two dozen individuals and entities involved in transferring oil, procuring weapons, and providing financial services for this Iran-backed terrorist organization,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent. “Treasury will use all tools at its disposal to expose the networks and individuals enabling Houthi terrorism.”
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, and builds on OFAC’s numerous actions targeting Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, procurement operatives, and suppliers. The U.S. Department of State designated Ansarallah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, effective February 16, 2024, and subsequently also designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) pursuant to section 2019 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on March 5, 2025.
houthi oil companies and financial facilitators
Despite the pressure of international sanctions, the Houthis continue to acquire a significant amount of revenue through illicit oil sales, generating over $2 billion annually. As part of the Houthi oil sales operation, the Iranian government both sells and provides a free monthly shipment of oil to the Houthis using Iranian-owned or affiliated companies based in Dubai, UAE.
Al Sharafi Oil Companies Services and Adeema Oil FZC, owned by Waleed Fathi Salam Baidhani, and Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC are among the major Houthi oil and gas facilitators based in the UAE. These companies receive financial support from the Iranian government and maintain ties to Iranian nationals. Alsaa Petroleum and Shipping FZC (Alsaa), owned by Iranian national Imran Asghar, is one of the main UAE-based, Iran-affiliated companies involved in facilitating financial transactions between the Iranian government and Houthi-affiliated oil companies. Alsaa has also acted as a front company to make payments and review trades for Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC. The Houthis pay the Iran-affiliated companies by sending money to UAE-based exchanges, including Janat Al Anhar General Trading LLC (Janat Al Anhar), via exchange companies in Sana’a, Yemen. Janat Al Anhar is the new operating name of Abu Sumbol General Trading L.L.C. following its 2024 designation for support to Iran-based Houthi financial facilitator Sa’id al-Jamal.
Houthi leaders charge ordinary Yemenis exorbitant prices for oil and oil derivatives, pocketing the proceeds of these sales for personal gain and to fund the group’s military operations. Zayd ‘Ali Ahmed Al-Sharafi (Zayd Al-Sharafi) uses his businesses, Yemen-based Black Diamond Petroleum Derivatives and Al-Sharafi Oil Companies Services, to import and export oil for the Houthi-led government. As part of his business dealings, Zayd Al-Sharafi maintains multiple vessels that transferred oil to the Houthis. Zayd Al-Sharafi is also affiliated with Janat Al Anhar in Dubai, using it to evade sanctions on himself and the Houthis.
New Ocean Trading FZE (New Ocean) is a commercial entity that provides logistical support to the Houthis. New Ocean acted as an agent for a Yemeni company that procured military equipment for the Houthis. New Ocean imported communications devices, technical and control systems, computers, electronics, drilling equipment, industrial and electrical materials, and power systems to Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen. New Ocean provided logistical and financial support services to Houthi oil importer Arkan Mars Petroleum Company as the shipper on an Arkan Mars Petroleum Company fuel shipment between Sharjah, UAE, and Ras Isa, Yemen.
Al Sharafi Oil Companies Services, Zayd ‘Ali Ahmed Al-Sharafi, Adeema Oil FZC, Waleed Fathi Salam Baidhani, and New Ocean Trading FZE are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. Alsaa Petroleum and Shipping FZC and Imran Asghar are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC. The SDN List entry for Abu Sumbol General Trading L.L.C. has been updated to reflect the company’s current name, Janat Al-Anhar.
HOUTHI WEAPONS SMUGGLING OPERATIONS
Houthi procurement operatives rely on a sprawling network of front companies, logistics firms, and shipping facilitators to transport weapons and other military-grade materials into Yemen. One such company, Wadi Kabir Co. for Logistics Services (Wadi Kabir), is a Sana’a-based shipping facilitator with a branch in Oman that has conducted weapons smuggling operations for the Houthis. Wadi Kabir owns a network of warehouses and trucks in Yemen that it uses to coordinate weapons and other illicit shipments in support of Houthi procurement efforts. In 2022, representatives of Wadi Kabir attempted to smuggle 52 Kornet anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) hidden inside purpose-built fake electric generators from Oman to the Houthis in Sana’a, which were seized by the internationally-recognized Republic of Yemen Government authorities. The Oman-based shipping and logistics firm Rabya for Trading FZC (Rabya), at the behest of its Oman-based director and beneficial owner Ameen Hamid Mohammed Dahan (Dahan), used its warehouse located in Oman’s Al-Mayzunah Free Market Zone to assist Wadi Kabir to conceal the Kornet ATGMs for transport into Yemen.
Houthi leaders use a variety of Yemen-based exchange houses to finance weapons-related purchases. Al-Ridhwan Exchange and Transfer Company (Al-Ridhwan), based in Sana’a, is a Houthi-affiliated exchange house that plays a key role in facilitating payments for the group’s weapons procurement and other destabilizing activities. Al-Ridhwan is jointly overseen by the Houthis’ so-called Director of Procurement Muhammad Ahmad Al-Talibi (Al-Talibi), a primary aide to U.S.-designated Houthi spokesman Mohammad Abdulsalam and at least one other Houthi operative, and maintains accounts in Sana’a for the Houthis’ so-called Ministry of Defense and other Houthi-aligned institutions. Al-Talibi has repeatedly directed Al-Ridhwan to use its depositors’ funds to finance Houthi militant activities and support Houthi smuggling operations into Yemen from Iran, Djibouti, and elsewhere in the Red Sea region. Al-Talibi and other key Houthis leaders have used Al-Ridhwan to support their regional web of procurement operatives and front companies, facilitating numerous payments to Houthi-owned accounts outside Yemen for missile components, advanced weapon systems, and other military-grade materials.
Wadi Kabir Co. for Logistics Services, Rabya for Trading FZC, and Al-Ridhwan Exchange and Transfer Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. Ameen Hamid Mohammed Dahan is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, Rabya for Trading FZC.
HOUTHI AVIATION COMPANIES AND PROCUREMENT
Houthi procurement and financial operatives have also attempted to use the group’s international networks to purchase aircraft for use in smuggling and revenue-generation schemes. The Houthis have collaborated with U.S.-designated, Houthi-aligned Yemeni businessman Muhammad Al-Sunaydar (Al-Sunaydar) to establish two new airlines based in Sana’a called Barash Aviation and Cargo Company Limited (Barash Aviation) and Sama Airline. Barash Aviation, an air cargo transportation company, has assisted the Houthis’ efforts to purchase a commercial jet aircraft, which Houthi leaders planned to use to transport illicit cargo through Houthi-controlled Sana’a International Airport (SIA). The Houthis and Barash Aviation collaborated to identify and evaluate potential aircraft for purchase. Houthi leaders established Sama Airline as a sister company to Barash Aviation, intending for Sama Airline to generate revenue for the Houthis by providing passenger service from SIA. In early 2025, Barash Aviation and Sama Airline attempted to partner with U.S.-designated and convicted arms dealer Viktor Anatolijevitch Bout to purchase suitable commercial aircraft for both companies.
In addition to Al-Sunaydar, Yemeni businessman Adil Mutahhar Abdallah Al Muayyad (Al Muayyad) has also played a key role in Barash Aviation’s and Sama Airline’s business operations and aircraft procurement efforts. Beyond his role with Barash Aviation and Sama Airline, Al Muayyad acts as a purchasing official for the so-called Houthi Ministry of Defense, facilitating procurement of military-grade and dual-use commercial equipment on behalf of the Houthis. He maintains close personal relationships with high-ranking Houthi figures, including U.S.-designated Mohamed Ali Al-Houthi, and is responsible for conducting economic outreach to potential foreign partners on behalf of the Houthis.
Barash Aviation and Cargo Company Limited and Sama Airline are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. Adil Mutahhar Abdallah Al Muayyad is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Houthis.
VESSELS AND SHIP CAPTAINS
Following the designation of the Houthis as an FTO in March 2025, OFAC issued a humanitarian general license to allow in-progress deliveries of petroleum products to ports in northern Yemen to be safely offloaded through April 4, 2025. However, even after this allowed period for wind-down activities, certain vessels have continued to deliver petroleum products to Houthi-controlled ports, providing vital economic support to the Houthis and in clear violation of restrictions on doing business with an FTO.
Albarraq Shipping Co and its sole director, Ebrahim Ahmed Abdullah Al-Matari, facilitated the delivery of oil products to Ras Isa port via the vessel ALBARRAQ Z after the expiration of OFAC’s GL 25A. ALBARRAQ Z discharged oil products at Ras Isa port in July 2025. Ahmad Ismail served as the captain of ALBARRAQ Z.
OFAC is also designating the captains of four previously designated vessels that delivered petroleum products to Houthi-controlled ports. Ahmad Adriss served as captain of the U.S.-designated vessel SARAH, which delivered Liquefied Petroleum Gas to the Houthi-controlled port of Ras Isa in June 2025. Ahmad Bseis served as captain of the U.S.-designated oil tanker ATLANTIS MZ, which also discharged gasoline at Ras Isa in June 2025. Ranveer Singh served as captain of the U.S.-designated vessel AKOYA GAS, which discharged its cargo at Ras Isa in April 2025. Alexander Yurovich Pshenichnyy served as captain of the U.S.-designated vessel VALENTE, which discharged gasoline at Ras Isa in May 2025.
Albarraq Shipping Co, Ahmad Ismail, Ahmad Adriss, Ahmad Bseis, Ranveer Singh, and Alexander Yurovich Pshenichnyyare being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. Ebrahim Ahmed Abdullah Al-Matari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, Albarraq Shipping Co.
The ALBARRAQ Z is being identified as property in which Albarraq Shipping Co has an interest, pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.